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Imagining Future People in Biomedical Law
From Technological Utopias to Legal Dystopias within the 
Regulation of Human Genetic Modification Technologies
Britta van Beers
7.1 Introduction: The Rise of Utopian Technologies
Emerging technologies such as medical biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and 
cognitive sciences, have elicited wild speculation about, and vivid imageries of, the 
future of mankind, even beyond the realm of fantasy novels and science- fiction 
movies. Apparently, the fact that human beings are becoming the object of far- 
reaching technological interventions and inventions is to many a development of 
such an unprecedented nature that new images and vocabularies are invoked to 
describe both the hopes and the fears that these technologies engender. Charged 
expressions such as ‘taking evolution into our own hands’, ‘playing God’, and ‘the 
Promethean drive to mastery’, are a commonplace in these discussions.
Among scientists, prophetic statements about humanity’s future can also be 
heard. A recent example is Stephen Hawking’s much discussed proclamation that 
‘the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human 
race’. Even if existing forms of artificial intelligence enable the heavily paralysed 
theoretical physicist to communicate, he is concerned that in the future a more 
evolved type of artificial intelligence ‘would take off on its own, and re- design itself 
at an ever increasing rate’. Hawking fears that ‘humans, who are limited by slow 
biological evolution, couldn’t compete, and would be superseded’.1
Where Hawking’s warnings go back to a bleak and dystopian imagination of the 
future, other scientists’ speculations on artificial intelligence are overtly utopian. 
For example, computer scientist Raymond Kurzweil predicts that a coming artifi-
cial ‘intelligence explosion’ will allow humans to transcend their biological natures, 
overcoming the limitations and fragilities of their bodies and brains.2 Kurzweil is 
1 R Cellan- Jones, ‘Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind’, BBC 
News, 2 December 2014 <http:// www.bbc.com/ news/ technology- 30290540> accessed 18 April 2015.
2 R Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Penguin 2006).
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not alone in his techno- optimism. Other, equally ‘transhumanist’ scientists believe, 
for example, that a combination of artificial intelligence, regenerative medicine,3 
and cryogenic preservation4 will allow them to attain immortality within their cur-
rent life times. As French philosopher of science Dominique Lecourt aptly states, 
these hopes of human transcendence through technological means border on reli-
gious faith; the transhumanist project can be described as a form of techno- theology.5
In a way, it should not surprise anyone that even scientists are caught fantasizing 
out loud. The classic view of scientific practice, according to which scientists reveal 
and analyse the ‘cold’ facts of nature, is no longer tenable— if it ever was— as scien-
tists are openly engineering nature within these new, technological contexts. Indeed, 
Kurzweil’s dreams and prophesies illustrate how emerging technologies not only 
give rise to utopian narratives, but are often based themselves on utopian motives. 
They are, in essence, ‘utopian technologies’,6 to use a phrase coined by philosopher 
of science Hans Jonas, who explains these technologies’ utopian nature as follows:
By the kind and size of its snowballing effects, technological power propels us into goals of a 
type that was formerly the preserve of Utopias…. The one thing we can really know of them 
is their extremism as such— that they concern the total condition of nature on our globe and 
the very kind of creatures that shall, or shall not, populate it.7
Moreover, since contemporary scientific practice heavily depends on financial 
investments from third parties, investors’ personal imaginations of the future are 
also increasingly influencing technological developments. Recent statements by 
well- known billionaire Silicon Valley entrepreneurs Elon Musk and Peter Thiel offer 
striking illustrations of that tendency. Musk’s quest to make space travel routine and 
affordable for everyone goes back to his dream to make humans ‘a multiplanetary 
species’. The science- fiction novel Foundation by Isaac Asimov serves as his main 
source of inspiration.8 Thiel, in his turn, invests large sums of money into the con-
struction of artificial islands where people can live according to libertarian ideas. Ayn 
Rand’s capitalistic utopia Atlas Shrugged serves as the guiding light to his project.9
3 Eg, A de Grey, a well- known scientist in the field of regenerative medicine, believes that the first 
persons to become 150 years or older have already been born. See, K Kelland, ‘Who Wants to Live 
Forever? Scientist Sees Aging Cured’, Reuters, 4 July 2011 <http:// www.reuters.com/ article/ 2011/ 07/ 
04/ us- ageing- cure- idUSTRE7632ID20110704> accessed 19 April 2015.
4 Eg, several prominent members of the Oxford Future of Humanity Institute will have their heads fro-
zen after death in the hope that someday they can be brought back to life. See J Leake, ‘Freeze a Jolly Good 
Fellow: Three Oxford Dons are Paying to be Cryonically Preserved’, Sunday Times, 9 June 2013 <http:// 
www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/ sto/ news/ uk_ news/ Education/ article1271389.ece> accessed 19 April 2015.
5 D Lecourt, Humain, Posthumain. La Technique et la Vie (Presses Universitaires de France 2003) 12.
6 H Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (University 
of Chicago Press 1985) 21– 22, 42.
7 ibid, 21.
8 R Carroll, ‘Elon Musk’s Mission to Mars’, The Guardian, 17 July 2013 <http:// www.theguardian.
com/ technology/ 2013/ jul/ 17/ elon- musk- mission- mars- spacex> accessed 9 May 2015.
9 ‘Floating Cities: PayPal Billionaire Plans to Build a Whole New Libertarian Colony Off the Coast 
of San Francisco’, Daily Mail, 25 August 2011 <http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/ article- 2024761/ 
Atlas- Shrugged- Silicon- Valley- billionaire- reveals- plan- launch- floating- start- country- coast- San- 
Francisco.html#ixzz3ZdeRPWgF> accessed 9 May 2015.
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Some of these technologies are now also targeting human nature itself as an 
object of change. These so- called human enhancement technologies, which aim to 
improve human evolution or to redirect the human condition, open up the pos-
sibility of turning certain visions of the human, or the post- or trans- human, into 
reality. Especially within the field of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), the 
once science- fiction scenarios of genetically designed human beings are on the verge 
of becoming a reality.
Tellingly, in a period of less than two decades, many of the technologies to select 
and engineer children before birth, which were depicted, albeit in a negative way, 
in the 1997 science- fiction movie Gattaca, have become, or are about to become, 
available. Pre- implantation genetic diagnosis, for example, has facilitated genetic 
selection of embryos since the 1990s; in 2012, prenatal whole genome sequenc-
ing was used to map an embryo’s entire genome for the first time;10 and in 2015 it 
was announced that a new technology, known as ‘human gene- editing’, will soon 
make it possible to modify the embryo’s genetic constitution.11 The technology of 
human gene- editing will be further explained below, as it will be used as a recurring 
example to illustrate the main arguments of this chapter.
As these rapid developments in the field of assisted reproduction make abun-
dantly clear, technological projects of human autopoiesis necessitate reflection on 
the question of what makes humans human in the first place. In the words of the 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, ‘whether these speculations are manifesta-
tions of a feverish imagination or serious prediction, an expression of displaced 
eschatological needs or a new variety of science- fiction science’, they are all ‘exam-
ples of an instrumentalisation of human nature initiating a change in the ethical 
self- understanding of the species’.12
Interestingly, to regulate these utopian technologies, a legal field has emerged 
which equally relies on future scenarios, fictions, imaginations, and symbolizations 
of the human. However, as will become clear, the legal imaginations of the future in 
this field tend to be more dystopian in nature.
In this chapter, I explore and analyse the ways in which imaginings of the future 
of mankind, and mankind itself, have found their way into international legal regu-
lation of biomedical technologies. As will be shown, the use of different types of 
legal fictions to represent the human is one of the primary ways within international 
biomedical law, also called biolaw, to deal with the uncertainties caused by these 
emerging technologies. Moreover, as the texts of several international conventions 
and declarations in biomedical law indicate, one of the main aims of international 
biolaw is to protect no less than the future interests of humankind.
The increasing recognition of the importance of imagination for both the 
development and international regulation of biomedical technologies can be 
illustrated by a 2015 international summit on biotechnology:  Biotechnology 
10 HC Fan, W Gu, J Wang et al, ‘Non- Invasive Prenatal Measurement of the Fetal Genome’ (2012) 
487 Nature 320.
11 For more on this, see section 7.2.1.
12 J Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Polity Press 2003) 42.
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and the Ethical Imagination: A Global Summit (BEINGS 2015). This meeting 
was organized in the spirit of the famous 1975 Asilomar Conference, which 
brought together biomedical experts to develop guidelines in reaction to the 
then recently established moratorium on DNA recombinant technologies. What 
makes BEINGS 2015 of interest for this chapter is that all speakers and partici-
pants were explicitly invited to ‘reimagine the aspirations of biotechnology’13 
in order to contribute to the development of international guidelines. For that 
purpose, prominent biomedical scientists were brought together with policy 
makers, corporate partners, and scholars from varying backgrounds, ranging 
from literature to religion. Tellingly, one of the keynote speakers was Margaret 
Atwood, novelist of critically acclaimed dystopian novels on biomedical tech-
nology, such as Oryx and Crake.14
This chapter discusses the importance of imagination for legal and ethical frame-
works in the field of the biosciences. It builds on German– American phenomeno-
logical philosopher Hans Jonas’s reflections on the emergence of technological risks 
for humanity, as developed in his influential work, The Imperative of Responsibility.15 
The chapter’s main argument is that Jonas’s thoughts can explain three important 
characteristics of international biolaw: its reliance on dystopian rather than utopian 
scenarios (section 7.2); the metaphysical nature of the view of humanity on which 
international biolaw relies to protect against future risks and uncertainties (section 
7.3); and finally, the use of imagination and fiction in this legal field (section 7.4). 
Throughout this chapter, these points will be illustrated by recent debates on the 
international ban on human germline genetic engineering. This prohibition, which 
is at the heart of international biolaw, is currently being questioned, as recent sci-
entific breakthroughs in the field of gene- editing are about to turn human genetic 
engineering into a reality.
7.2 Human Genetic Modification: Between Technological 
Utopia and Legal Dystopia
7.2.1  The rise of human genetic modification technologies
As the technology of human germline modification is currently making the tran-
sition from science fiction to actual science, and is generating much debate on 
its risks and dangers, it offers the perfect case to examine how possible futures 
and future people are imagined within biomedical regulation. Human germline 
modification involves making changes to the human genome that are passed on to 
future generations. Although human genetic engineering was not technologically 
possible until recently, it has been prohibited in international law documents since 
the 1990s. A prime example is Article 13 of the Council of Europe’s Convention 
13 See the summit’s site <http:// www.beings2015.org/ about.html> accessed 11 June 2015.
14 M Atwood, Oryx and Crake (McClelland and Stewart 2003).
15 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (n 6).
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of Human Rights and Biomedicine,16 which states that ‘an intervention seeking to 
modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or 
therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the 
genome of any descendants’. In 1997, when the Convention came into force, this 
provision was based on mere speculation. In early 2015, however, the significance 
of Article 13 was revitalized when two technologies in the field of human genetic 
germline modification made international headlines: mitochondrial replacement 
and human gene- editing.
In February 2015, the United Kingdom became the first state worldwide to legalize 
mitochondrial replacement.17 The aim of this technology is to prevent the transmission 
of mitochondrial diseases to children- to- be. It involves enucleating an egg cell of a third 
party, and filling it with the nucleus of an egg cell from the prospective mother. This spe-
cial egg cell is subsequently fertilized with the sperm of the prospective father. The result-
ing embryo is popularly known as a ‘three parent embryo’, as the child will be genetically 
related to two women and one man. Moreover, the technology could be said to constitute 
a form of germline genetic modification as described in Article 13, because the gen-
etic alterations will be passed on to future generations. Nevertheless, as the intervention 
affects only mitochondrial DNA, and the nucleus remains unaffected, this technology 
establishes only minor heritable changes to the germline. Advocates of this technology 
therefore state that it is far- fetched to speak of designer babies in this context.18
This seems much less the case for the second biogenetic technology, which has 
been the subject of vigorous debates since the beginning of 2015. Several leading 
scientific journals19 announced in March 2015 that a remarkably simple and cheap 
genome engineering method, called CRISPR- Cas9, was close to being successfully 
applied to human genomes. This ‘gene- editing’ technology allows scientists to ‘cut 
and paste’ DNA with extreme precision. According to the authors of said scientific 
articles, human gene- editing marks no less than ‘the advent of a new era in biology 
and genetics’20 as it brings the possibility of ‘engineering the perfect baby’21 within 
reach. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that this technology aims to realize interven-
tions with the human genome that are prohibited by, for instance, Article 13.
16 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine) (adopted 4 April 1997, entered into force 1 February 
1999) CETS 164.
17 H Devlin, ‘Britain’s House of Lords Approves Conception of Three- Person Babies’, The Guardian, 
24 February 2015 <http:// www.theguardian.com/ politics/ 2015/ feb/ 24/ uk- house- of- lords- approves- 
conception- of- three- person- babies> accessed 20 March 2015.
18 ibid. Also see, eg, ethicist John Harris’s viewpoint as voiced in S Connor, ‘Scientist Who Pioneered 
“Three- Parent” IVF Embryo Technique Now Wants to Offer It to Older Women Trying for a Baby’, The 
Independent, 8 February 2015 <http:// www.independent.co.uk/ news/ science/ threeparent- embryos- 
an- ivf- revolution- or- a- slippery- slope- to- designer- babies- 10031477.html> accessed 14 May 2015.
19 A Regalado, ‘Engineering the Perfect Baby’, MIT Technology Review, 5 March 2015 <http:// www.
technologyreview.com/ featuredstory/ 535661/ engineering- the- perfect- baby/ > accessed 10 May 2015; 
and E Lanphier, F Urnov, S Ehlen Haecker et al, ‘Don’t Edit the Human Germline’ (2015) 519 Nature 
410; D Baltimore, P Berg, M Botchan et al, ‘A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and 
Germline Gene Modification’, (2015) 348 (6230) Science 36.
20 Baltimore et al, ibid, 38. 21 Regalado, ‘Engineering the Perfect Baby’ (n 19).
Imagining Future People in Biomedical Law122
12
The question is how this legal ban will affect current scientific developments, 
and, vice versa, how these technologies will affect the legal status of Article 13. 
The aforementioned articles suggest that for now, a majority within the scientific 
community is in favour of a moratorium on human gene- editing. However, this 
could change since, as will be discussed below, many of the current objections are 
not absolute in nature. In addition, one can doubt how effective legal bans on 
human genetic engineering will prove to be. International legal documents, such 
as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, have not been ratified in 
many countries. Moreover, even if they have been, the question is how they can 
be enforced. Indeed, shortly after the international discussion on a possible mora-
torium had begun, a group of Chinese scientists announced that they had already 
applied CRISPR- Cas9 to human embryos to modify an aberrant gene that causes 
beta- thalassaemia, albeit with mixed results.22 Finally, because the legal ban on 
human genetic engineering is one of the central provisions in international biolaw, 
the rise of human genetic modification raises the larger question of what the pro-
jected risks are against which biolaw aims to protect, and why the biolegal frame-
work features quite a pessimistic outlook on the possible outcomes of biomedical 
developments. Section 7.2.2 focuses on these last questions.
7.2.2  Biolaw’s dystopian approaches to utopian technologies
Biomedical technologies enable interventions with the human body and human 
life on a biogenetic level. From the perspective of the biosciences, human life is 
perceived as a set of building blocks which can be regrouped, remodelled, rebuilt, 
recombined, and replicated at will. As such, biomedical interventions may have far- 
reaching effects on a collective level, both positive and negative. Indeed, according 
to the human rights conventions and declarations that have been developed since 
the 1990s to regulate biomedical developments, these technologies ultimately affect 
the interests of humanity, both in the present and the future. The preamble of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Council of Europe) describes 
these interests as follows:
Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human 
dignity;
Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present 
and future generations;
Stressing the need for international co- operation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits 
of biology and medicine.
Even if these sentences also stress the huge possible benefits of biomedical science, in 
general, international biolaw seems to focus more on its potential harms and dangers. It 
could be said, somewhat paradoxically, that within the legal regulation of these ‘utopian 
22 I Sample, ‘Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos in Controversial World First’, The 
Guardian, 23 April 2015 <http:// www.theguardian.com/ science/ 2015/ apr/ 23/ scientists- genetically- 
modify- human- embryos- in- controversial- world- first> accessed 10 May 2015.
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technologies’, dystopian scenarios tend to prevail. Accordingly, the legal framework 
of biomedical regulation is characterized by prohibitions on and restrictions of the 
use and development of biomedical technologies. The most important international 
conventions and declarations in this field prohibit, in addition to human germline 
genetic modification, eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of 
persons,23 using ARTs to select a future child’s sex,24 the creation of human embryos 
for research purposes,25 the use of the human body and its parts for financial gain,26 
and creating genetically identical human beings.27
All these prohibitions involve speculation on several levels. As some of these 
technologies, such as human cloning, have not been developed yet, and as the 
actual effects of these technologies are therefore as yet unknown, these prohibitions 
necessarily involve the regulation of potential, future situations. Moreover, these 
provisions aim to protect the interests of possible future legal subjects. Some tech-
nologies, such as ARTs, look to the creation of future persons; others establish gen-
etic changes which can be passed down to future generations. Finally, to express the 
possible harms involved, relatively vague expressions are used, such as respect for 
human life and human dignity. In all these cases it remains unclear what the views 
of these future people on these technologies will be, or how their fates will be exactly 
affected. Techno- optimists view these uncertainties as a major weakness of current 
international regulation of biomedical developments. At the aforementioned global 
summit, BEINGS 2015, for instance, a recurring complaint was that vague fears and 
highly speculative harms are now thwarting biomedical progress, thereby standing 
in the way of saving millions of lives. Moreover, the cautious and even dystopian 
tenet within ethical and legal approaches to biomedical technologies was heavily 
criticized. As one of the summit’s participants voiced his disdain: ‘we need to resist 
bowing at the altar of amorphous existential risks without identifiable harms’.28
These criticisms have been largely left unanswered in legal discourse. One of the 
central arguments in this chapter is that the anti- utopian approach advocated by 
Jonas in The Imperative of Responsibility can fill this gap. His view of emerging tech-
nologies and their accompanying uncertainties can explain the cautious approach 
to biomedical technologies that is generally employed in international law.
23 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (adopted 18 December 2000, entered into force 1 December 
2009), OJEC C 364, art 3(2)(b).
24 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, art 14.
25 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, art 18(2).
26 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, art 21; EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(n 23), art 3(2)(c).
27 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning 
Human Beings (adopted 12 January 1998, entered into force 1 March 2001) CETS No 168, art 1; 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 23), art 3(2)(d); Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights (adopted 11 November 1997, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Res 29 C/ 17, endorsed by UN General Assembly Declaration, 
United Nations General Assembley (UNGA) Res 53/ 152, 9 December 1998), art 11.
28 M Darnovsky, ‘Tired Tropes and New Twists in the Debate about Human Germline Modification’, 
Biopolitical Times, 28 May 2015 <http:// www.biopoliticaltimes.org/ article.php?id=8618> accessed 
3 December 2015.
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According to Jonas, emerging technologies are of such an unprecedented, utopian 
scale, and will have such far- reaching effects for the future of mankind, that they 
necessitate a new ethical paradigm. The new type of ethics which he advocates does 
not limit itself to establishing the rights and duties towards contemporary members of 
the legal community, but also takes into account responsibilities towards future gen-
erations. Within his Fernethik, ‘the indefinite future, rather than the contemporary 
context of the action, constitutes the relevant horizon of responsibility’.29 As a starting 
point to this future- oriented type of ethics, Jonas formulates his famous revision of 
Kant’s categorical imperative to express the responsibilities to future people: ‘Act so 
that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human 
life.’30
Nevertheless, it is clear that predictions of the long- range effects of our techno-
logical actions are characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Jonas describes our 
current predicament as follows:
Living now constantly in the shadow of unwanted, built- in, automatic utopianism, we are 
constantly confronted with issues whose positive choice requires supreme wisdom— an 
impossible situation for man in general, because he does not possess that wisdom, and in 
particular for contemporary man, because he denies the very existence of its object, namely, 
objective value and truth. We need wisdom most when we believe in it least.31
As a result, a certain degree of imagination and speculation is inevitable in legal 
and ethical frameworks that are developed to regulate technological interven-
tions. For Jonas, this state of affairs does not pose an insurmountable obstacle. 
On the contrary, it forms the starting point for his ethic of the future. In this vein, 
as will be discussed in a later section, Jonas uses imagination as the cornerstone of 
his methodological approach. Moreover, for him uncertainty has important nor-
mative implications, which he expresses through the formulation of a new ethical 
principle. This principle commands ethical and legal decision- making ‘to give 
in matters of a certain magnitude— those with apocalyptic potential— greater 
weight to the prognosis of doom than to that of bliss’.32 For his proposed pre-
cautionary and overtly anti- utopian approach, Jonas offers three reasons.33 First, 
by taking evolution in our own hands, we are compressing the slow and grad-
ual process of natural evolution, with its small ‘mistakes’ along the way, into a 
much more fast- paced and ambitious process of reform of human nature, with 
accordingly much larger, even catastrophic risks. As a result, the stakes involved 
in technological interferences with human evolution will be much higher and 
its potential effects more radical than is the case with natural evolution. Second, 
Jonas observes that technological developments often gather an internal dynamic 
and momentum of their own, escaping from explicit moral deliberation. Third, 
he argues that precaution is in place because ultimately nothing less than human 
nature is at stake.
29 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (n 6) 9. 30 ibid, 11. 31 ibid, 21.
32 ibid, 34. 33 ibid, 31– 33.
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7.3 Imagining the Dangers of Human Genetic Modification 
within Biolaw
Jonas’s anti- utopian approach is able to explain the dominance of dystopian sce-
narios within biolaw. Moreover, his proposal to give priority to negative prognoses 
over positive ones corresponds with the precautionary approaches which can be 
recognized within international biolaw. However, an important question remains 
unanswered: what is the exact nature of the risks involved in regulation of contested 
biomedical developments?
In order to answer this question, this section focuses on the rationale behind the ban 
on altering the human germline, as expressed in Article 13. Three possible scenarios 
that may have influenced Article 13 will be sketched and explored: the scenarios of 
classic risk governance, existential risk, and dangers to human dignity. Which read-
ing offers the most convincing explanation of the ban on human genetic germline 
modification in light of the Explanatory Report to the Convention?34 Answering this 
question will allow, more generally, a better understanding of the special nature of risk 
within biolegal discourse.
A first possible reading of the ban is that the application of this technology to the 
human genome is still unsafe and poses serious health risks for those involved. As the 
scientists who are calling for a moratorium point out, ‘the precise effects of genetic 
modification to an embryo may be impossible to know until after birth’ and ‘potential 
problems may not surface for years’.35 Their main recommendations are more research 
and better education of the public by experts ‘about this new era of human biology’.36
The clinical risks of the technology of human gene- editing, in its current stage 
of development, certainly warrant a classic system of risk governance based on the 
precautionary approach. After all, although the precautionary principle is most 
famously applied in the field of environmental law, it is also widely accepted to 
apply to public health interests.37 Additionally, some of the concerns about inter-
ventions with the human genome resemble concerns which can be recognized in 
environmental law. To a certain extent, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
for instance, raise concerns similar to those raised by genetically modified human 
embryos. Similarly, protection of biodiversity could be understood to include pro-
tection of diversity in the human gene pool.
However, it seems that a traditional risk approach falls short within public 
deliberation on this issue on several levels. A risk approach seems to turn the issue 
34 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, DIR/ JUR (97)5 <http:// 
www.coe.int/ en/ web/ conventions/ full- list/ - / conventions/ treaty/ 164> accessed 18 February 2017.
35 Lanphier et al, ‘Don’t Edit the Human Germline’ (n 19) 411.
36 Baltimore et al, ‘A Prudent Path’ (n 19) 38.
37 As the European Commission notes in its communication on the principle, ‘The precautionary 
principle is not defined in the Treaty, which prescribes it only once— to protect the environment. But 
in practice, its scope is much wider, and specifically where preliminary objective scientific evaluation 
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the 
environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection 
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of human gene- editing into merely a safety issue. From that perspective, all that 
is needed is a scientific assessment of the clinical risks involved in human gene- 
editing. These should then be weighed against the possible clinical benefits. The 
public debate would then merely have to focus on finding a balance between these 
scientific perspectives. However, such an approach ignores key aspects of the issue 
of human gene modification. As a group of scholars, including prominent science 
and technologies scholar Sheila Jasanoff, eloquently describes the deficit of a classic 
risk approach to human genome engineering as a reaction to the aforementioned 
call for a moratorium on human gene- editing:
the problem is not simply a lack of technical knowledge. The answer to how we should act 
does not lie in the technological details of CRISPR. It is our responsibility to decide, as 
parents and citizens, whether our current genetic preferences should be edited, for all time, 
into our children and our children’s children. A moratorium without provisions for ongoing 
public deliberation narrows our understanding of risks and bypasses democracy…. Even in 
technologically advanced societies, we tend to defer to expert judgments about which risks 
are reasonable to worry about, and which are not. This is a democratic deficit. It inhibits our 
capacity to participate thoughtfully in imagining the futures we want and governing technologi-
cal change accordingly [emphasis added].38
In other words, a classic risk approach to human gene- editing obfuscates the essen-
tially political and moral nature of this issue. Indeed, even if gene- editing would be 
safe for clinical application in humans, this still would not take away many of the 
most serious concerns that people have about this technology. In fact, the comments 
in the Explanatory Report to the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine on 
Article 13 hardly mention patient safety. The concerns seem of a larger scale than can 
be grasped from a clinical risk perspective. As the Explanatory Report states:
The progress of science, in particular in knowledge of the human genome and its applica-
tion, has raised very positive perspectives, but also questions and even great fears. Whilst 
developments in this field may lead to great benefit for humanity, misuse of these develop-
ments may endanger not only the individual but the species itself.39
In other words, human germline genetic engineering not only poses risks to public 
health, but also to the continued existence of the entire human species. Similarly, 
within biolegal scholarly literature, concerns about the future of the human spe-
cies have been expressed within the context of human genetic engineering. For 
instance, health law scholar George Annas warns that lifting the ban on this tech-
nology may open the door to genetic genocide.40 By this he means that ‘inheritable 
chosen for the Community’, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle’, COM (2000)1 (2 February 2000) 3.
38 S Jasanoff, JB Hurlbut, and K Saha, ‘Human Genetic Engineering Demands More Than 
a Moratorium’, The Guardian (7 April 2015) <http:// www.theguardian.com/ science/ political- 
science/ 2015/ apr/ 07/ human- genetic- engineering- demands- more- than- a- moratorium> accessed 11 
May 2015.
39 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (n 34) para 89.
40 See, eg, G Annas, ‘Crimes Against the Human Species (Type II Crimes Against Humanity 
Explained)’ in BC van Beers et al (eds), Humanity Across International Law and Biolaw (CUP 2015) 
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genetic alteration carries the prospect of developing a new species of humans that 
could turn into either destroyers or victims of the human species’.41 Additionally, 
in order to protect ‘the endangered human’, Annas, together with scholars Isasi and 
Andrews, proposes a Convention on the Preservation of the Species. As they write, 
their project can be described as conservative in that they seek to conserve the 
human species.42 Their ‘bioconservatism’, as the school of thought which unites all 
sorts of different criticisms of biomedical technologies is called,43 can therefore be 
understood quite literally as aimed at biogenetic conservation. Their concerns seem 
to echo Hawking’s aforementioned fear that new forms of artificial intelligence 
might spell the end of the human race.
The type of risk that surfaces in both Hawking’s and Annas’s thoughts could be 
described as existential risk. Nick Bostrom, prominent transhumanist scholar and 
director of the Oxford Future of Humanity Institute, offers the following defini-
tion: ‘an existential risk is one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth- 
originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential 
for desirable future development’.44 More than a traditional risk perspective, this 
approach is able to grasp the large scale of the stakes involved in human genetic 
engineering. As the preambles to the most important conventions and declarations 
in this legal field emphasize, it is indeed ultimately mankind, the human species, 
humanity or however one wishes to designate the human collective, that is involved 
in the biomedical project. Similarly, Habermas describes the ethics that should 
guide us within the regulation of human genetic engineering as an ‘ethics of the 
species’ (Gattungsethik).45
Nevertheless, even if texts of international biolaw seem to originate in a fear 
that our humanity is at risk, the existential risk approach is not able to get to the 
core of the ban on human germline modifications. The main problem is that an 
existential risk approach seems to reduce the ban on human germline modifica-
tion to a special measure of wildlife conservation, with the difference being that 
it is now humans who are protected as endangered species. Yet, a closer look at 
Article 13 reveals that it is not the fear of human extinction, decimation, or other 
grave material risks for the human species which serves as guiding thought, but 
rather a fear of the destruction of humanity in less tangible ways. As is written in 
the subsequent words of the Explanatory Report to Article 13: ‘The ultimate fear is 
of intentional modification of the human genome so as to produce individuals or 
entire groups endowed with particular characteristics and required qualities.’46 In 
other words, regardless of the safety issues involved in germline modification, and 
41 GJ Annas, LB Andrews, and RM Isasi, ‘Protecting the Endangered Human:  Toward an 
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations’ (2002) 28 American Journal of 
Law & Medicine 151.
42 ibid.
43 In debates on biomedical issues, it is common to distinguish bioconservatives from transhuman-
ists. See, eg, N Bostrom, ‘In Defense of Posthuman Dignity’ (2005) 19 Bioethics 202.
44 N Bostrom, ‘Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority’ (2013) 4(1) Global Policy 15.
45 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (n 12) 71.
46 Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (n 34) para 89.
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the question whether this technology would put the prolonged existence of the 
human species at risk, it is undesirable to produce human individuals or groups 
according to a certain design or to satisfy a list of desired characteristics. Even if 
the remaining comments on Article 13 do not offer further explanation of these 
vague words, it is clear that, according to this Article, the main problem resides in 
the fact that human genetic modification opens up the possibility of one person 
designing the other.
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the Explanatory Report does not offer 
more guidance. The harm involved in the resulting ‘self- instrumentalisation 
of the species’47 is hard to put into words. It goes beyond the harm princi-
ple, and beyond a violation of rights. As French biolegal scholar Labrusse- Riou 
states: ‘The problem is that nobody suffers in this issue. What suffers is society, 
the frame of reference, culture, which is probably graver.’48 Indeed, as many 
philosophers writing on these issues point out, whether they are in favour of the 
use of these technologies or not, the prospect of one person designing the other 
calls into question no less than the foundational distinctions of any rights- based 
system of governance:49 the distinction between persons and things,50 between 
chance and choice,51 and between the given and the made.52 In legal philoso-
pher Ronald Dworkin’s words:
The overall structure of our moral and ethical experience … depends, crucially on a fun-
damental distinction between what we are responsible for doing or deciding, individually 
or collectively, and what is given to us, as a background against which we act or decide, 
but which we are powerless to change…. We dread the prospect of people designing other 
people because that possibility in itself shifts … the chance/ choice boundary that struc-
tures our values as a whole, and such a shift threatens, not to offend any of our present 
values, derivative or detached, but, on the contrary, to make a great part of these suddenly 
obsolete.53
47 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (n 12) 66.
48 Labrusse- Riou made these remarks as a member of the French national ethical committee 
CCNE. See M Marcuzzi, ‘La revendication des corps’ in E Dockès and G Lhuilier (eds), Le corps et ses 
représentations (Litec 2001) 31.
49 In Fukuyama’s words, ‘What is it that we want to protect from any future advances in biotechnol-
ogy? The answer is, we want to protect the full range of our complex, evolved natures against attempts 
at self- modification. We do not want to disrupt either the unity or the continuity of human nature, 
and thereby the human rights that are based on it.’ F Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences 
of the Biotechnology Revolution (Farrar, Straus en Giroux 2002) 172.
50 In Habermas’s words: ‘[…] advances of genetic engineering tend to blur the deeply rooted cat-
egorical distinctions between the subjective and the objective, the grown and the made. What is at 
stake, therefore, with the instrumentalization of prepersonal life is the ethical self- understanding of 
the species, which is crucial for whether or not we may go on to see ourselves as committed to moral 
judgment and action.’ Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (n 12) 71.
51 R Dworkin, ‘Playing God: Genes, Clones, and Luck’ in R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory 
and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press 2000) 443– 44.
52 In Sandel’s words, ‘To appreciate children as gifts is to accept them as they come, not as objects 
of our design, or products of our will, or instruments of our ambition.’ M Sandel, The Case Against 
Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (Harvard University Press 2007) 45.
53 Dworkin ‘Playing God’ (n 51) 443– 44.
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Correspondingly, the feared harm does not seem to be of a physical nature, as 
in public health concerns or fears for ‘genetic genocide’. Instead, what is feared 
could be described as a ‘metaphysical destruction’, in the words of international law 
scholar Delmas- Marty.54 As Jonas also points out, such metaphysical or symbolic 
‘risks’ do not lend themselves to risk calculation, as they can hardly be measured 
and weighed.55
In a similar vein, if human genetic modification is believed to touch upon human 
nature, it is not so much human nature in the biological or genetic sense of the 
word. In a way, it makes no sense to want to conserve the human genome as it is. As 
Article 3 of UNESCO’S Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights56 aptly states: ‘The human genome, which by its nature evolves, is subject 
to mutations.’ Rather, the reason why humanity may be affected by human gen-
etic engineering is that it seems to undermine our ‘normative self- understanding’, 
in Habermas’s words.57 By this he means the image of the person on which legal 
and ethical systems of thought are based: the view of the person as an end in him-
self, endowed with an intrinsic and absolute value, who is to be distinguished from 
things, animals, instruments, and commodities.
The common expression for this normative view of humanity, also in legal 
discourse, is, of course, human dignity. Until recently, one could regard human 
dignity’s normative view of mankind as ‘merely’ the founding fiction of human 
rights discourse, and therefore consider its meaning hardly legally relevant out-
side the context of the preambles to international human rights declarations 
and conventions. However, within the context of international biolaw, human 
dignity’s image of humanity has been reinvented as a legal guideline for the 
technological remaking of human nature. It has become part of a normative anthro-
pology that has been developed to guide the technological remaking of the human 
species.
As such, human dignity has been elevated to being the central principle within 
legal regulation of biomedical developments, both on a national and an interna-
tional level. As the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine states, ‘The concept of human dignity, which is also highlighted, con-
stitutes the essential value to be upheld. It is at the basis of most of the values 
emphasised in the Convention.’58 Nevertheless, the meaning of human dignity 
remains shrouded in controversy, also on a legal level. One of the main problems is 
that the normative image of humanity, as implied by human dignity, is surrounded 
by fictions and speculations which are not grounded in empirical reality, let alone 
biogenetic reality.
54 M Delmas- Marty, ‘Certitude et Incertitudes du Droit’ in H Atlan et al (eds), Le Clonage Humain 
(Le Seuil 1999) 92.
55 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (n 6) 33– 34.
56 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (n 27).
57 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (n 12) 72.
58 Explanatory Report to the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine (n 34) para 9.
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7.4 From Science Fiction to the Legal Fiction  
of Human Dignity
As discussed in section 7.3, the uncertainties involved in biomedical technologies 
necessitate a legal approach which exceeds the level of protection offered by trad-
itional modes of risk governance. It could be said that through this special legal 
approach, a new level of speculation is introduced. Biomedical regulation does not 
only rely on ‘what- if ’ scenarios and prognoses of possible effects, but also opera-
tionalizes a fictional, normative account of mankind: the subject of human dig-
nity. As Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights59 describes that 
subject, ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood.’ Interestingly, the dystopian scenarios of biolaw are thus mobilized 
to protect a rather utopian view of man.
The idealized and at the same time inherently contradictory nature of that view 
of mankind is not a secret. In fact, it is clear, as the Declaration’s preamble also 
states, that this image of humanity was invoked in post- war human rights discourse 
as a reaction to the historical fact that ‘disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind’. 
Nevertheless, the fictional character of human rights and their implicit view of man 
is attacked every now and again, whether it is by calling human rights discourse 
‘nonsense upon stilts’60 or by comparing the belief in human rights with the belief 
in witches and unicorns.61
Since the rebirth of human dignity within the context of international biolaw, 
the critique of the fictional character seems to have revived. From that perspective, 
within the context of biolaw, Schmitt’s notorious adage ‘whoever says humanity, 
seeks to deceive’ has gained new significance. More generally, the biosciences seem 
to have caused new tensions between normative and empirical views of the human. 
On the one hand, in response to biomedical developments, legal scholars reaffirm 
their belief in human rights as ‘a revolt against the laws of nature, a refusal to stay 
confined within the limits of the biological conception of man’.62 On the other 
hand, from the perspective of the biosciences, the belief in liberté, égalité, fraternité, 
which could be regarded as an important founding ‘myth’ of human rights, seems 
to lose much of its credibility.
This latter tenet becomes clear upon closer inspection of the motto’s three com-
ponents in the light of biomedical developments. All human beings are born free 
59 Adopted 10 December 1948, UN General Assembly Resolution 217A(III), GAOR, 3rd Sess, 
Part I, Resns, 71.
60 J Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued During 
the French Revolution (1792), line 198  <http:// oll.libertyfund.org/ titles/ bentham- the- works- of- 
jeremy- bentham- vol- 2/ simple#lf0872- 02_ label_ 001> accessed 17 May 2015.
61 A MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Gerald Duckworth 1981) 67.
62 Delmas- Marty, ‘Certitude et Incertitudes’ (n 54) 107 (author’s translation).
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in human rights discourse, yet in biological reality many chances in life appear to 
depend on genetic predispositions. All human beings are born equal, yet know-
ledge of our genomes is bringing new inequalities to light. Finally, when it comes 
to brotherhood, the question is to what extent current systems of solidarity will be 
undermined now that the life sciences are lifting the ‘veil of ignorance’ which cov-
ered our genetic fates until recently. Human genome- editing will cause even more 
friction between biomedical and dignity- based views of humanity. In this vein, 
UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee expresses the following fear in a 
statement on human genome- editing:
The goal of enhancing individuals and the human species by engineering the genes related to 
some characteristics and traits … impinges upon the principle of respect for human dignity 
in several ways. It weakens the idea that the differences among human beings, regardless 
of the measure of their endowment, are exactly what the recognition of their equality pre-
supposes and therefore protects. It introduces the risk of new forms of discrimination and 
stigmatization for those who cannot afford such enhancement or simply do not want to 
resort to it.63
Consequently, an increasingly popular line of attack on human dignity is to depict 
it as a harmful fiction, not grounded in reality. A recent piece, tellingly entitled ‘The 
Stupidity of Dignity’, written by well- known Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker, 
can serve as an example of this tendency to debunk the fiction of human dignity on 
empirical grounds. According to Pinker, the concept of human dignity has gained 
too much importance in public debates on biomedical issues. In his view, dignity is 
nothing more than a phenomenon of human perception: ‘[j] ust as the smell of bak-
ing bread triggers a desire to eat it, and the sight of a baby’s face triggers a desire to 
protect it, the appearance of dignity triggers a desire to esteem and respect the dig-
nified person’.64 Pinker contrasts his view of dignity with the prevailing interpreta-
tion of human dignity underpinning biomedical laws. One of his prime allegations 
is that such readings of human dignity are out of touch with reality:
Ever since the cloning of Dolly the sheep a decade ago, the panic sown by conservative 
bioethicists, amplified by a sensationalist press, has turned the public discussion of bio-
ethics into a miasma of scientific illiteracy. Brave New World, a work of fiction, is treated 
as inerrant prophesy. Cloning is confused with resurrecting the dead or mass- producing 
babies. Longevity becomes ‘immortality’, improvement becomes ‘perfection’, the screening 
for disease genes becomes ‘designer babies’ or even ‘reshaping the species’. The reality is that 
biomedical research is a Sisyphean struggle to eke small increments in health from a stagger-
ingly complex, entropy- beset human body…. In every age, prophets foresee dystopias that 
never materialize, while failing to anticipate the real revolutions.65
63 UNESCO International Bioethics Committee, Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reflection on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights (Paris 2015) <http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/ 0023/ 002332/ 
233258E.pdf> accessed 3 December 2015.
64 S Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of Dignity: Conservative Bioethics’ Latest, Most Dangerous Ploy’, The 
New Republic, 28 May 2008 <https:// newrepublic.com/ article/ 64674/ the- stupidity- dignity> accessed 
14 May 2015.
65 ibid.
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In other words, Pinker reduces the humanizing legal fiction of human dignity to the 
type of fiction involved in science fiction. According to him, only evidence- based 
arguments, which demonstrate clear and identifiable harms of certain technologies, 
can serve as a reason to restrict biomedical research. Any other considerations, such 
as the question what kind of future we want for the human species, seems of no 
importance. This raises the question of what Pinker’s view is on ethics. In an opin-
ion on CRISPR, Pinker offers a clear answer to this question:
The primary moral goal for today’s bioethics can be summarized in a single sentence. Get out 
of the way. A truly ethical bioethics should not bog down research in red tape, moratoria, or 
threats of prosecution based on nebulous but sweeping principles such as ‘dignity,’ ‘sacred-
ness,’ or ‘social justice’. Nor should it thwart research that has likely benefits now or in the 
near future by sowing panic about speculative harms in the distant future.66
Although Pinker’s approach is based on a rather caricatured and reductionist 
view of human dignity, his polemic against the role of human dignity in bioeth-
ics and biolaw does raise a valid question: how can the reliance on imagination 
and doom scenarios within the context of biolaw be justified? Indeed, biolegal 
discourse seems to be replete with fictions, speculations, and allusions to dysto-
pian scenarios of the future. Moreover, there does seem to be a special connection 
between human dignity and imagination, even if most people will agree, unlike 
Pinker, that human dignity is more than mere science fiction. The question then 
becomes what the role of imagination and the fiction of human dignity should be 
in coming to a legal understanding of the possible dangers involved in biomedical 
developments.
To come to a better understanding of the role of imagination within regula-
tion of emerging technologies in general, and the role of human dignity’s homme 
rêvé67 more specifically, Jonas’s reflection offers several clues. To unfold the role of 
imagination for the development of moral and legal frameworks to guide emerging 
technologies, Jonas uses the concept of ‘the heuristics of fear’. According to the heu-
ristics of fear, ‘moral philosophy must consult our fears prior to our wishes to learn 
what we really cherish’.68 In other words, an imagination of the risks and dangers 
of future developments is heuristically needed to uncover, identify, and explicate 
the principles at stake. Ultimately, this negative approach can, in Jonas’s view, also 
lead to a better understanding of the meaning of human dignity in these issues. In 
Jonas’s words:
Just as we should not know about the sanctity of life if we did not know about killing …; and 
just as we should not know the value of truth without being aware of lies, nor of freedom 
without the lack of it, and so forth— so also in our search after an ethics of responsibility for 
distant contingencies, it is an anticipated distortion of man that helps us to detect that in the 
66 S Pinker, ‘The Moral Imperative for Bioethics’, The Boston Globe, 1 August 2015 
<https:// www.bostonglobe.com/ opinion/ 2015/ 07/ 31/ the- moral- imperative- for- bioethics/ 
JmEkoyzlTAu9oQV76JrK9N/ story.html> accessed 2 December 2015.
67 Delmas- Marty, ‘Certitude et Incertitudes’ (n 54) 107; DWJM Pessers, Menselijke Waardigheid en 
het Persoonsbegrip in het Recht (Lemma 2005).
68 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (n 6) 27.
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normative conception of man which is to be preserved from it. And we need the threat to 
the image of man— and rather specific kinds of threat— to assure ourselves of his true image 
by the very recoil from these threats.69
Jonas’s reliance on negative scenarios, which also surfaces in this quote, has already 
been discussed in the previous sections. What seems more interesting, at this point, 
is which new role for law and morality is implied by his heuristics of fear. In general, 
two different interpretations are possible.
A first interpretation of Jonas’s heuristics of fear emphasizes the aspect of fear as 
a guideline for decision- making. Within this line of thinking, there is a truth to the 
primitive feelings and basic intuitions raised by biomedical developments. Indeed, 
Jonas himself writes that ‘the revulsion of feeling which acts ahead of knowledge’70 
can help us apprehend the values at stake.
In a similar vein, a certain strand in bioethical thought stresses the wisdom hid-
ing in feelings of repugnance. Probably the best known effort to bring this line of 
thought to fruition comes from Leon Kass, one of the central targets of Pinker’s rant 
against theoconservative (‘theocon’) bioethics. Kass himself explains the wisdom of 
repugnance in an article with the same title:
Revulsion is not an argument; and some of yesterday’s repugnances are today calmly 
accepted— though, one must add, not always for the better. In crucial cases, however, 
repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power fully to 
articulate it.71
A more moderate version of Kass’s wisdom of repugnance can be recognized in 
Michael Sandel’s essay The Case Against Perfection. Although the feelings of ‘moral 
vertigo’ and ‘unease’ which are raised by biomedical developments can hardly be 
expressed in terms of conventional arguments such as autonomy, fairness, and indi-
vidual rights, this fact is, according to Sandel, only a sign that contemporary ‘sci-
ence is moving faster than moral understanding’.72 Similarly, Habermas argues that 
the ‘revulsion’ many of us feel at being confronted with ‘the chimaera that bear wit-
ness to a violation of the species boundaries that we had naively assumed to be inal-
terable’, or the ‘disgust’ we experience when thinking about the creation of embryos 
for industrial purposes, is an indication of the fact that biomedical technologies 
ultimately ‘affect the very concept we have of ourselves as cultural members of the 
species of “humanity” ’.73
Kass’s proposal to use feelings of revulsion and repugnance as signposts for nor-
mative deliberation has been heavily criticized.74 Indeed, to rely on unreflected 
intuitions, gut feelings, and primitive emotions within the regulation of these issues 
brings with it a major risk of unfounded, prejudiced, and irrational conservatism. 
69 ibid, 26– 27. 70 ibid, 27.
71 LR Kass, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’, (1997) 216(22) New Republic (2 June 1997) 17– 26, 22.
72 Sandel, The Case Against Perfection (n 52) 9.
73 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (n 12) 39– 40.
74 See, eg, J Harris, ‘Clones, Genes and Human Rights’ in J Burley (ed), The Genetic Revolution and 
Human Rights. The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1998 (OUP 1999) 82– 83; MC Nussbaum, Hiding from 
Humanity. Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton University Press 2004) 81– 82.
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Correspondingly, human dignity within this approach quickly devaluates into 
either a ‘theocon’ slogan used to cover up the absence of sound arguments, as 
Pinker writes, or into a knock- down argument against which no counter- evidence 
is possible.
Nevertheless, the less radical approach of Sandel and Habermas to the role of 
intuitions and emotions in bioethical decision- making still leaves the door open to 
a second, more constructive interpretation of Jonas’s heuristics of fear. Within this 
interpretation, the important role of imagination and symbolization for legal and 
ethical decision- making on biomedical developments is emphasized. According to 
this reading of Jonas’s heuristics of fear, lawyers and ethicists must first visualize and 
imagine the possible long- range effects of anticipated technological developments, 
to be able to develop a proper normative framework. As Jonas describes this new 
type of anticipatory ethical and legal reflection:
What is here contemplated, therefore, is a casuistry of the imagination which, unlike the 
customary casuistries of law and morality that serve the trying out of principles already 
known assists in the tracking and discovering of principles still unknown. The serious side 
of science fiction lies precisely in its performing such well- informed thought experiments, 
whose vivid imaginary results may assume the heuristic function here proposed. (See, eg, 
A Huxley’s Brave New World).75
Whereas Pinker refers to omnipresent allusions to Brave New World as an example 
of the naïve and unrealistic worldview of many contemporary biolawyers and 
bioethicists, Jonas regards the use of imagination in legal- ethical contexts and the 
reliance on dystopian scenarios as indispensable for the development of new nor-
mative frameworks. In a way, it is only logical that as a reaction to the utopian 
scale of current technological developments, and the techno- theological beliefs and 
aspirations of the scientists involved, a legal discourse has come into being which 
equally relies on imaginations and fictions. From that perspective, biolaw’s dys-
topian scenarios on the possible dangers of emerging technologies counterbalance 
the utopian scenarios in which emerging technologies ultimately root.
Moreover, in answer to Pinker’s critique, it can be stressed that Jonas’s ‘casuistry 
of the imagination’ is intended to be mobilized at a preliminary stage of decision- 
making; that is, during the construction of a normative framework for further 
deliberation. It only serves as a heuristic device to detect the principles and interests 
worth protecting. This means that when it comes to application of these newly 
found principles to specific situations, mere imagination cannot suffice. As Jonas 
puts it, in that stage of decision- making, the uncertainty of ‘long- term projections 
becomes a grievous weakness’.76 Instead, from then on, more realistic prognoses 
of the future need to take over. Nevertheless, the basic uncertainty of future con-
sequences remains. At this point in his line of reasoning, Jonas unfolds his precau-
tionary rule that in political deliberation on technological developments the bad 
prognosis should prevail over the good one.
75 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (n 6) 30.
76 ibid.
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Jonas’s case for the use of imagination in legal and ethical approaches to techno-
logical developments is able to offer new perspectives on the role of biolaw and 
its central principle— human dignity— in the regulation of biomedical develop-
ments.77 First, his approach throws light on the deficit of traditional concepts of risk, 
as exemplified by risk assessment discourse. It could be said that scientists such as 
Pinker, who argue for ‘evidence- based’ regulation, in which solely tangible risks offer 
enough weight for legal bans and restrictions, make use of a very ‘narrow imagin-
ation of risk’.78 Such a narrow conception of risk, often accompanied by a certain 
disdain for notions such as human dignity, seems to go back to what could be called 
a scientistic tendency within debates on emerging technologies; the thought that it 
should be ultimately up to scientists to decide what counts as risk, and thus as a suf-
ficient ground for more restrictive approaches. The scientistic bias can lead to a con-
ceptual impoverishment of democratic deliberation, disengaging the public from 
moral and political reflection on the question of which goals emerging technologies 
should serve. As Hurlbutt writes in an article on the governance of human genome- 
editing: ‘[i] t is our technologies that should be subject to democratically articulated 
imaginations of the future we want, not the opposite…. Imagining what is right and 
appropriate for our world— and what threatens its moral foundations— is a task for 
democracy, not for science.’79 The importance of the principle of human dignity 
for public, democratic deliberation on this issue can be explained against this back-
ground. The legal concept of human dignity can be regarded as an essential tool for 
citizens in democratic societies to imagine the future that they want for humanity, 
and to use that moral imagination as a guideline for biomedical regulation.
Moreover, contrary to what Pinker seems to believe, the use of imagination in 
bioethical and biolegal deliberation can also be used in more nuanced ways than 
merely posing blanket legal bans. For example, more implicit images of the human 
can be discerned within legal frameworks which offer practical rules for the creation, 
transfer, and conservation of technological hybrids of human origin in contempo-
rary bioeconomies, such as human immortalized cell lines, human embryonic stem 
cells, or frozen human egg cells. Within legal discourse, these human semi- objects 
are not treated as normal objects of property law that can be sold or used for indus-
trial purposes, but instead symbolized as objects with a special status.80
77 In this chapter, I focus on the importance of imagination for biolegal decision-making. For 
reflection on the importance of imagination for ethical decision- making on emerging technologies, 
see M Coeckelberg, Human Being @ Risk: Enhancement, Technology and the Evaluation of Vulnerability 
Transformations (Springer 2013) 103– 06.
78 S Jasanoff, JB Hurlbutt, and K Saha, ‘CRISPR Democracy: Gene Editing and the Need for 
Inclusive Deliberation’ (2015) 32 Issues in Science and Technology <http:// issues.org/ 32- 1/ crispr- 
democracy- gene- editing- and- the- need- for- inclusive- deliberation/ > accessed 2 December 2015.
79 JB Hurlbutt, ‘Limits of Responsibility:  Genome Editing, Asilomar, and the Politics of 
Deliberation’ (2015) 5 Hastings Center Report 12.
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Additionally, Jonas’s appeal to legal and ethical imagination finds reson-
ance with the fact that also, on a deeper level, ‘law is part of a distinctive man-
ner of imagining the real’, to use the words of anthropologist Clifford Geertz.81 
Interestingly, this function of law in symbolizing, imagining, and representing 
the world around us gains special significance within the context of biolaw. After 
all, biomedical technologies are blurring, as mentioned, the distinctions between 
foundational categories, such as subject and object, life and death, and animal 
and human. As existing vocabularies seem to be falling short of making sense of 
biomedical developments, legal discourse is stepping in to contribute to the cre-
ation of an imaginaire social to symbolize these new biomedical hybrids. Without 
doubt, other systems of meaning profoundly affect the legal process of symboliza-
tion, such as medical, religious, and economic perspectives. However, when the 
symbolic orders of these systems collide, as is mostly the case in bioethical matters, 
law has to mediate between these competing systems of value and meaning. Under 
these circumstances of symbolic uncertainty, the law, with its intricate systems of 
multiple and inter- related terms, qualifications, constructions, and categories, can 
become of vital importance to the overall cultural- symbolic process to come to 
terms with technological hybrids.82
The same could be argued in relation to the new status questions raised by 
human genetic engineering. What should we make of the ‘three parent babies’ of 
mitochondrial replacement? Should women who donate their egg cells for this pro-
cedure be recognized as a second legal mother? And in the likely case that the law 
answers this question in the negative, should her genetic ties with the child, even 
if they are quite minimal, be reflected in other ways in family law? Even if these 
questions seem almost impossible to answer, the law will nevertheless have to come 
up with solutions.
What about the designer babies of human gene- editing? The confounding com-
plexity of the questions which are raised by human genetic engineering can be illus-
trated by the emergence of wrongful life claims from children who are born out of 
new technological settings. In the future, the law will without a doubt also be faced 
with wrongful life claims from children in case of mistakes which are made during 
the process of human gene- editing, or in case these children would rather have been 
born with a different genetic profile. Can they sue their makers or designers for 
these ‘defects’? Can they claim the right to be born with a different genetic profile, 
or even in a different body? And if so, what does that mean for law’s concept of the 
person? While coming to an answer to these immensely difficult questions, judges 
will inevitably have to draw up new lines between person and thing, artifice and 
nature, and chance and choice.
81 C Geertz, ‘Local Knowledge. Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective’ in C Geertz, Local 
Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books 1983) 184.
82 Elsewhere, I have analysed law’s special role in the general process of cultural- symbolic represen-
tation of biomedical hybrid objects more elaborately. See BC van Beers, ‘From Winged Lions to Frozen 
Embryos, Neomorts and Human- Animal Cybrids: The Functions of Law in the Symbolic Mediation 




Additionally, the symbolic perspective on technological interventions is also able 
to make sense of the feelings of moral vertigo and the emotions of revulsion, to 
which Sandel, Habermas, and Jonas refer when they discuss the impact of techno-
logical developments on existing normative frameworks. These feelings and emo-
tions could be regarded as an indication of the radical ways in which emerging 
technologies question existing cultural- symbolic categories. However, as mere indi-
cations of the radical impact of technological interventions, these feelings and emo-
tions cannot replace legal and ethical arguments, as already argued.
One can wonder whether law is up to this task of imagining future biomedical 
realities and countering the symbolic uncertainties caused by biomedical hybrids. 
However, the fact is that law is already called upon to answer the semi- metaphysical 
questions raised by technological developments, even if law is perhaps not the most 
likely or best equipped candidate to do so. Decisions from European courts on the 
meaning of human dignity for technological regulation can serve as illustrations.83 
These decisions attest to the fact that even if the risks involved in biomedical devel-
opments are rather of a metaphysical than a physical nature, this does not preclude 
the possibility of a gradual process of legal symbolization, in which existing foun-
dational categories can be reconstructed and reconsidered along the way. It could be 
said that in this process, law makers and judges are unfolding, what Bruno Latour 
has called, an experimental metaphysics.84 Applied to law, the perspective of experi-
mental metaphysics can be taken to mean that the categorical distinctions between 
human and animal, alive and dead, and person and thing, which are each being 
uprooted by biomedical technologies, can be renegotiated in international biolaw 
through a continuous, case- by- case, and therefore experimental approach, in which 
different symbolizations and representations of the human gradually take shape.
7.5 Conclusion
Imagining the future; that is what scientists are currently doing by creating new 
futures and even new modes of human existence. If that is the case, lawyers can-
not but join them in this effort of the imagination if societies want to offer some 
direction for these essentially political and ethical questions. Drawing from Jonas’s 
normative framework for utopian technologies, this chapter has argued that legal 
imagination is primarily involved on two levels.
First, as the long- term consequences of biomedical technologies, such as human 
genetic engineering, are unknown yet potentially catastrophic for human evolution 
or human existence, law makers are called upon to give priority to the negative over 
83 See, eg, on IVF and gamete donation: Evans v United Kingdom [GC] No 6339/ 05 (Grand Chamber, 
10 April 2007); SH v Austria No 57813/ 00 [GC] (Grand Chamber, 3 November 2011); on organ dona-
tion: Elberte v Latvia No 61243/ 08 (Fourth Section, 13 January 2015); and on the use of embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes: Case C- 34/ 10 Brüstle v Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I- 09821.
84 B Latour, Politiques de la Nature. Comment Faire Entrer les Sciences en Démocratie (La Découverte 
2004) 97.
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the positive prognosis. This strategy is clearly visible in precautionary regulatory 
approaches. From that perspective, there is a legitimate place for dystopian ways of 
thinking and imagining in biolegal discourse.
Second, human genetic engineering and other human enhancement technolo-
gies bring about uncertainties and risks also on a more conceptual level. Much of 
the controversy surrounding these emerging technologies is due to the fact that cat-
egorical distinctions, such as between person and thing, and chance and choice, are 
blurred in radical ways. As a consequence, the emergence of biomedical technolo-
gies also entails what could be called metaphysical risks and symbolic uncertainties. 
How should we come to an understanding of three- parent embryos, gene- edited 
children, or human– animal cybrids? Indeed, all of these biomedical ‘hybrids’ seem 
to surpass existing foundational categories. Interestingly, the law is becoming of 
increasing importance in the social- cultural process of imagining and evaluating 
possible new creations. Also in this sense, law’s imaginative powers are increasingly 
mobilized to regulate and represent the new realities which may be called into exist-
ence by emerging technologies.
